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ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT:

STANDING TO SUE. BENNETT V. SPEAR,

117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
I. INTRODUCTION

The requirements of standing to sue under the citizen suit provision of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the proper application of the prudential
"zone of interest" test for standing, have been the subject of much debate and
disagreement.' In fact, standing has been a hotly contested issue throughout
the history of modem environmental laws and citizen suit provisions.2 The
United States Supreme Court seized an opportunity to address these issues in
Bennett v. Spear.
Part H of this note briefly reviews the facts of Bennett v. Spear. Part III
examines the background of both constitutional and prudential theories of
standing. It also examines the issues of standing under the citizen suit
provision of the ESA and under the Administrative Procedures Act. Part IV
then analyzes the Court's reasoning in Bennett. Finally, Part V of the note
considers the significance of the Court's decision in Bennett.
II. FACTS

Around the beginning of the twentieth century, the Bureau of Reclamation
(Bureau)' constructed the Klamath Project 5 along the Oregon and California
border in order to provide irrigation water and control flooding.6 Lake bed
lands were drained and reclaimed and reservoirs were created for these
purposes.7 The sale of rights to the water in the reservoirs covered the costs of
the project.8 Petitioners, two Oregon irrigation districts and the operators of
two ranches within those districts, contracted for part of these water rights.9
Petitioners used the water for both irrigation purposes and recreational

1. See Kathleen C. Becker, Bennett v. Plenert: EnvironmentalCitizen Suits and the Zone
of Interest Test, 26 ENvTL. L. 1071, 1077-81 (1996).
2. See Sanford A. Church, A Defense of the "Zone of Interests" Standing Test, DUKE
L.J., Apr. 1983, at 447, 448.
3. 117 S. Ct. 1154(1997).
4. The Bureau of Reclamation is a part of the United States Department of the Interior.
See Brief for the Respondents at 6, Bennett v. Spear, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (1997) (No. 95-813).
5. The Klamath Project was constructed under the authority of the Reclamation Act of
1902, 43 U.S.C. § 371. See Brief for Petitioners at 2, Bennett v. Spear, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (1997)
(No. 95-813).
6. See Brief for Petitioners, at 3 n. 1, Bennett (No. 95-813).
7. See id. Oregon and California gave title to these lands to the United States for project
development. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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activities.'0 In 1988, the government listed two species of sucker fish found in
parts of the Klamath Project reservoirs as endangered."
Under the ESA, 2 if an agency determines its actions may adversely affect
an endangered species, it must consult the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). 3
In 1992, the Bureau notified the FWS that long-term operation of the Klamath
Project might adversely affect the endangered sucker fish. 4 The FWS issued
a Biological Opinion which concluded the adverse effect was likely to occur.15
As required by the ESA, the FWS suggested "reasonable and prudent
alternatives" that the agency could take to avoid the adverse affect. 6 Among
other things, the FWS suggested the maintenance of certain minimum levels
of water. 7 The Bureau notified the FWS that it would comply with the
suggestions and opinions contained in the Biological Opinion. 8
Subsequently, in 1992, the Klamath Project area experienced a drought.
As a result of the minimum lake level requirements, the Bureau restricted
irrigation waters. Petitioners claimed the imposition of these minimum water
levels caused crop and cattle losses of seventy-five million dollars 9 and
implicitly determined a critical habitat. 20 They alleged the Biological Opinion
10. See Becker, supra note 1, at 1077.
11. See Brief for Petitioners at 3, Bennett (No. 95-813). The Lost River Sucker (Deltistes
luxatus) and Shortnose Sucker (Chasmistes brevirostris) were listed as endangered species
pursuant to the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1994). See 53 Fed. Reg. 27,130 (1988); see also Brief
for Petitioners at 3, Bennett (No. 95-813).
12. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
13. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (1995). The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of
Commerce share duties under the ESA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (1994). The Secretary of the
interior has delegated administration of its duties to the FWS. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b)
(1995). The Secretary of Commerce has delegated administration of its duties to the National
Marine Fisheries Service. See id. The sucker fish involved in Bennett fall within the
responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior. See id.
14. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1159.
15. See id.
16. See id. The ESA provides that if an agency's action may adversely affect the critical
habitat of an endangered species, the Biological Opinion shall suggest "reasonable and prudent
alternatives" that the agency can take in implementing the action. See 16 U.SC. §
1536(b)(3)(A) (1994).
17. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1159. The FWS suggested maintaining a minimum of
4524.0 feet of water in the Clear Lake Reservoir from February 1 to April 15 of each year "to
allow access to Willow Creek for spawning and dispersal of returning larval suckers" and a
minimum of 4523.0 feet for the rest of the year "to provide areas of adequate depths to reduce
desiccation, predation and freezing risks." Brief for Petitioners at 6 n.2, Bennett (No. 95-813).
For the Gerber Reservoir, the FWS suggested maintaining a minimum of 4799.6 feet of water
throughout the year "to maintain adequate water quantity and quality for summer and winter
survival of shortnose suckers." Brief for Petitioners at 6 n.2, Bennett (No. 95-813).
18. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1159.
19. See Joseph Perkins, Injecting Some Fairnessinto the Law, THE SAN DIEGO UNIONTRiB., March 28, 1997, at B7, available in 1997 WL 3124641.
20. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1160. Critical habitat is the term used to describe
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and suggested alternatives were not based on the "best scientific" data
available2 1 and did not consider economic impact as required by the ESA.2
Petitioners also alleged these actions were an abuse of discretion which could
be set aside pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 23
Petitioners filed suit under both the APA and the citizen suit provision of
the ESA in the United States District Court of Oregon.24 Petitioners named as
defendants the director and regional director of the FWS and the Secretary
of
26
the Interior.2 1 Petitioners did not name the Bureau or any of its officials.
The district court dismissed Petitioners' claim, finding they lacked
standing to sue under the "zone of interests" test.27 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that Plaintiffs must allege an interest
in the preservation of an endangered species in order to fall within the zone of
interests protected by the ESA.2 s The Ninth Circuit characterized Petitioners'
interests as economic. 2'9 The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit, holding Petitioners had standing to
sue under both the requirements of
3°and the zone of interests test.3 1
H1
Article
geographic areas that are determined to be "essential for the conservation of a species." See 16
U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) (1994). The designation of critical habitat has both legal and political
implications. Legally, the habitat cannot be modified or impaired. Politically, it creates
servitudes upon the land for the benefit of the protected species. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.9(4)(a)(ii) (2d ed. 1994).
21. See Brief for Petitioners at 8, Bennett (No. 95-813) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)
(1994)). Petitioners stated, "[T]he restrictions were imposed in the absence of any scientific
evidence that the withdrawal of irrigation water.., was damaging to the fish or that retaining
irrigation water in the reservoirs would help them." Id.
22. See Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1160. The ESA provides that "[t]he Secretary shall
designate critical habitat ... after taking into consideration the economic impact ... of
specifying any particular area as critical habitat." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994).
23. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1160. The APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994), provides for
judicial review of "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.
...
" 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994). Under the APA, a court shall "set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law .. " 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
24. See Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1160.
25. See id. at 1159. The Bureau of Reclamation administers the Klamath Project under
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior. See id.
26. See id.
27. See Bennett v. Plenert, No. 93-6076-HO, 1993 WL 669429, at *4 (D. Or. Nov. 18,
1993), rev'd sub nom., Bennett v. Spear, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (1997). The "zone of interests" test
limits the class of persons who may obtain judicial review to those plaintiffs whose grievance
falls within the zone of interests Congress intended to be protected by the statute. See Bennett,
117 S.Ct. at 1161. This is a judicially developed and self-imposed prudential test which can
be modified by Congress. See id.
28. See Bennett, 63 F.3d at 919. "[O]nly plaintiffs who allege an interest in the
preservation of endangered species fall within the zone of interests protected by the ESA." Id.
29. See id. at 919-920.
30. U.S. CONST. art. III. Article III provides in pertinent part: "The judicial power shall

1006

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20

III. BACKGROUND

Standing to sue refers to an individual's right to bring a lawsuit 2 and is
separate from the merits of the case.33 Before the court may consider the merits
of a case, the party bringing the suit must first demonstrate that he has
standing. 4 Article Ill of the United States Constitution,35 which established the
federal judicial system, sets up certain irreducible minimums that must be met
for a party to have standing.3 6 In addition, the Court has developed certain
prudential theories of standing.37 Part A of this section will consider the
irreducible minimums set by Article IMI. Part B will discuss prudential theories
of standing. Parts C and D will discuss standing under the ESA and the APA,
respectively.
A.

Article III Standing

Article III limits the power of the courts to adjudicating "cases" and
"controversies."3 The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to require
that a party must demonstrate an actual or threatened injury exists, 39 the cause
favorable
of the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's actions, 4 a
decision will likely redress the injury.4
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution . . . [and] to
Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State[.]"
U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2, cl. 1. For a discussion of Article III requirements, see infra notes 3442 and accompanying text.
31. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1169.
32. "Standing is a concept utilized to determine if a party is sufficiently affected so as to
insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1260
(6th ed. 1990).
33. See DAVID D. GREGORY, STANDING TO SUE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 11, 30 n.2 (1972).

34. See id.
35.

U.S. CONST. art. III.

36. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
37. See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.7

(2d ed. 1984).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
39. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (holding where
real estate brokers were "steering" prospective home buyers to different areas based on race,
depravation of benefits of living in an integrated society was sufficient allegation of injury for
residents of the described area, but not for residents of other neighborhoods).
40. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)
(holding plaintiffs did not have standing to sue the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) because it
was pure speculation as to whether the IRS had caused plaintiffs' injuries, the denial of benefits
by various hospitals).
41. Seeid.at38.
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The plaintiff's injury must be an injury in fact, and it must be personal to
the plaintiff.42 The Court in Allen v. Wright4 3 stated that to hold otherwise4
would allow a resident in Hawaii to challenge a tax exemption in Maine.
Courts would be flooded by litigation from plaintiffs with a value interest in the
situation, but no personal stake.45 Such disputes are better handled before other
branches of the government." Standing limits the cases heard by the courts to
those that are best addressed in that forum. 47
Proving an injury in fact is an essential element of the plaintiffs case. 8
It is not necessary at the pleading stage, however, for the plaintiff to actually
prove his injury. 49 A general factual allegation is presumed to include all facts
necessary to prove the allegation. 0 Actual proof of injury is not required until
later in the litigation.5
The second and third parts of Article I standing deal with causation and
were initially treated as two parts of a single causation requirement. 2 The
second part of Article III standing requires the plaintiff prove the cause of the
injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's actions. 3 The Court has defined
what is fairly traceable in the negative, stating an injury is not fairly traceable
if it results from the independent actions of a party not involved in the
lawsuit. 4 The third part of Article I standing requires that the judicial remedy
the plaintiff seeks be likely to redress the injury." The Court has noted that the

42. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). "[T]he plaintiff must
have suffered an 'injury in fact' - an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized ... and (b) 'actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical,'
.... " Id. (citations omitted).
43. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
44. See id. at 756.
45. See id.
46. See generally Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 (discussing powers and purpose
of legislative, executive and judicial branches).
47. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1990) (stating "[t]he doctrine of
standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial
process.").
48. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561.
49. See id
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19.
53. See Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 41-42.
54. See id. In Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., plaintiffs, low income individuals,
sued the IRS, claiming that an IRS ruling discouraged hospitals from providing services to
indigents. See id. at 28. The Court held plaintiffs did not have standing because it was pure
speculation as to whether the actions of the hospitals were the result of the IRS ruling. The
hospitals could have made their decisions without regard to the tax implications. See id. at 4243. The injury was not fairly traceable to the defendant's actions. See id.
55. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561.
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likelihood of the 5decision
redressing the injury must be more than speculative;
6
it must be likely.
B.

Prudential Theories of Standing

In addition to the requirements of Article III, the Court has used various
prudential theories of standing over the years.57 These court developed policybased limitations58 are judicially self imposed 59 for the purpose of further
distinguishing and limiting the types of cases courts will hear.6 °
The Court originally used a "legal interest" test under which parties had
to show invasion of a legal right.6' Where the action was not based in contract,
property, or tort, plaintiffs had to show their interests were actually founded on
63
a statute. 62 This involved difficult and time consuming statutory analysis.
The Court later modified this test and liberalized standing requirements in
Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co.64 to allow standing where the statute reflected
a legislative purpose to protect the interest. 6566 This revised test, however, still
required time consuming statutory analysis.
56. See id. In Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., another ground the Court used to
deny standing was the lack of a likelihood that the decision would redress the injury. The Court
stated it was "speculative whether the desired exercise of the court's remedial powers in this suit
would result in the availability to [plaintiffs] of such services." Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 43.
57. See WRIGHT, supra note 37, § 3531.7.
58. See Becker, supra note 1, at 1073. "Prudential standing inquiries have traditionally
been limited to three policy requirements: 1) that the injury relate to the plaintiff personally, 2)
that the plaintiff not bring generalized grievances, and 3) that the litigant's complaint be 'within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question."' Becker, supra
note I, at 1074.
59. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
60. See Becker, supra note 1, at 1073; see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 75 1.
61. See Church, supra note 2, at 449.
62. See Church, supra note 2, at 449-50.
63. See Church, supra note 2, at 449-50.
64. 390 U.S. 1 (1968). The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) expanded its service to
two towns in which Kentucky Utilities was the primary power provider. See id. at 4-5. These
towns were located within a county in which TVA was the primary power provider. See id. at
4-5. Respondent, Kentucky Utilities, sued TVA and the mayors of the two towns for
conspiracy to destroy its business. See id. at 5. It alleged TVA's provision of service to these
two towns violated an act which barred TVA from expanding its services to areas in which it
was not already the "primary" provider. See id. at 2-3.
65. See id. at 6. The Court noted several previous decisions had held that economic injury
caused by lawful competition was not sufficient to confer standing. See id. at 5-6.
The Court stated, however, that "when the particular statutory provision invoked does reflect
a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest, the injured competitor has standing to
require compliance with that provision." Id. at 6. See also Church, supra note 2, at 450.
66. See generally Church, supra note 2, at 451-52.
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In Association ofData ProcessingService Organizations,Inc. v. Camp,67
the Court greatly liberalized prudential standing requirements.68 There, the
petitioners, who were in the business of selling data processing services,
contested a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency that national banks could
provide data processing services. 69 The Court held that the legal interest test
should be applied to the merits of the case, not the issue of standing.70 The
Court introduced and applied a "zone of interests" test for standing.7' Under
the zone of interests test, the plaintiffs grievance must arguably fall within the
zone of interests the statute protects or regulates.72
While DataProcessingapplied the zone of interests test to a suit brought
under the APA, 73 the Court has listed the test as a general prudential consideration.74 Despite the ease with which the test can be articulated, courts have had
difficulty in determining when and how to apply it.75 The test has been applied
to suits not involving the APA, but the Court has indicated that the application
of the test in these situations will not be the same as it is under the APA. 76

67. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
68. See Church, supra note 2, at 450.
69. See Association of DataProcessing,397 U.S. at 151. Petitioners claimed this violated
the Bank Service Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1864, which provided "[n]o bank service
corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks."
See Association of DataProcessing,397 U.S. at 155.
70. See Association of Data Processing,397 U.S. at 153.
71. See id. See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). In Barlow, issued on the
same day as Association of Data Processing,the Court also applied the zone-of-interests test
stating, "[t]he right of judicial review is ordinarily inferred where congressional intent to protect
the interests of the class of which the plaintiff is a member can be found; in such cases, unless
members of the protected class may have judicial review the statutory objectives might not be
realized." Id. at 167.
72. See Association of Data Processing,397 U.S. at 153. The Court stated the applicable
prudential standing requirement was "whether the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question." Id. See also Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Valley Forge,454
U.S. at 474-75; Barlow, 397 U.S. 159.
73. See generally Association of Data Processing,397 U.S. 150.
74. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
75. See Church, supranote 2, at 452-56. See also Dialysis Center, Ltd. v. Schweiker, 657
F.2d 135, 138 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying the test by examining "objectives and obvious
purposes"); Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying the test by considering
only allegations in the complaint); National State Bank v. Smith, 591 F.2d 223, 233 (3d Cir.
1979) (applying the test by deciding whether it may reasonably be argued the interests are
protected).
76. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n. 16 (1987). The Court noted
that the application of the test to cases not involving the APA "should not be taken to mean that
the standing inquiry under whatever constitutional or statutory provision a plaintiff asserts is
the same as it would be if the 'generous review provisions' of the APA apply .. " Id.
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To further complicate matters, Congress can alter the prudential
limitations applied by the Court." Congress can negate the zone of interests
test and expand standing or it can create a more strict standard and limit
standing."
Congress has exercised this authority on several occasions,
particularly within the realm of environmental statutes, by incorporating
provisions for citizen suits.7 9 Congress can expand standing all the way to, but
no further than, the limits of Article 111.80 Without a specific indication by
Congress that it desires to expand or limit standing, the Court will apply the
81
zone of interests test.

C.

Standing Under the Endangered Species Act's Citizen Suit Provision

Beginning with the Clean Air Act82 in 1970, Congress has included citizen
suit provisions in environmental statutes.8 3 These provisions allow private
77. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501. "Congress may grant an express right of action to persons
who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules." Id.

78. See

RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN

E.

NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 2.13(0(2), at 205-06 (2d ed. 1992). "In other words, if Congress speaks, either explicitly or
implicitly, the Court will accept Congress' decision to confer standing to litigate constitutional
or statutory claims." Id.
79. See Robert B. June, The Structure ofStanding Requirementsfor Citizen Suits and the
Scope of CongressionalPower, 24 ENvTL. L. 761, 762 (1994). Congress has incorporated
citizen suit enforcement provisions into environmental statues to allow "private individuals and
organizations to file civil actions to remedy statutory violations or to compel the performance
of federal agency actions made mandatory by those statutes." Id. In its opinion in Bennett, the
Court cited several examples where Congress has altered standing requirements. See Bennett,
117 S. Ct. at 1162 (citing ESA Citizen Suit provision, "any person," 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)
(1994); Clean Water Act, "[any person] having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected," 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g)(1994); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, "any
person having an interest which is or may be adversely affected[,]" 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (1994);
Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act, "[a]ny person suffering legal wrong," 15
U.S.C. § 797(b)(5) (1994); Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act, "any person having a valid
legal interest which is or may be adversely affected.., whenever such action constitutes a case
or controversy[,]" 42 U.S.C. § 9124(a) (1994)).
80. See Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100. "Congress may, by legislation, expand standing to
the full extent permitted by Art. III, thus permitting litigation by one 'who otherwise would be
barred by prudential standing rules."' Id. (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 501). "In no event,
however, may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima ....
Id. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. at 578.
81. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 78, § 2.13(f)(2), at 205-06. "If Congress has not
so spoken, the plaintiff alleging a constitutional injury must not only overcome the Article III
standing requirements but also the use of standing as a tool ofjudicial self-restraint." ROTUNDA
& NOWAK, supra note 78, § 2.13(f)(2), at 205-06. See also Block v. Community Nutrition
Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994).
83. See June, supra note 79, at 765. For a general discussion of the origin and basic
structure of citizen suit provisions, see June, supra note 79, at 764-67 and nn. 11-30. For
examples of statutes where Congress has included citizen suit provisions, see supranote 79 and
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individuals and organizations to enforce the statutes,84 and were the result of
the government's perceived failure to enforce the statutes. 85 Congress has set
some limits on these citizen suits, however.8 6 Congress defines
who may bring
88
actions 7 and under what circumstances they may do so.
In 1973, Congress passed the ESA and included in it a citizen suit
provision which provides in part that "any person" may bring an action to
enforce certain provisions of the Act.8 9 Despite what seems to be a clear grant
of authority to any person, there has been much confusion and litigation about
the application of this section.' One concern has been how and to what extent
this grant affected the application of the zone of interests test. This confusion
is evident in the split that occurred between the Eighth and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeal. 91
The Eighth Circuit, in Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel,92 held that "any
person" under the ESA citizen suit provision meant the plaintiff need only meet
the requirements of Article II. 9 3 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit
determined in Bennett v. Plenert9 4 that the zone of interests test should apply
to the ESA. 95 It held that the plaintiffs did not have standing because their
commercial interests were plainly
inconsistent with the species preservation
96
interests protected by the ESA.
The United States Supreme Court took an opportunity to address these
issues when the plaintiffs in Bennett v. Plenert97 appealed the Ninth Circuit's
ruling.

accompanying text.
84. See June, supra note 79, at 762.

85. See June, supra note 79, at 764.
86. See June, supra note 79, at 764.
87. For example, under the Clean Water Act, Congress provided standing for "[any
person] having an interest which is or may be adversely affected." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1994).
88. See June, supra note 79, at 765-67. For example, most citizen suit provisions require
that the citizen provide 60 days notice prior to filing in order to allow the government a chance
to begin enforcement proceedings. See June, supra note 79, at 765; see, e.g., Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1994).
89. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994).
90. See Becker, supra note 1, at 1072.
91. See Becker, supra note 1, at 1077-80.
92. 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom., Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

93. See id. at 1039.

94. 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom., Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).

95. See id. at 919.
96. See id. at 921.

97. 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom., Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
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Standing Under the Administrative Procedures Act

Many cases involving environmental issues are brought under the auspices
of the APA because environmental actions frequently involve administrative
decisions.98 In order to have standing to bring an action under the APA, the
plaintiff must show three things" in addition to meeting the requirements of
Article III.100 First, he must show his claim falls within the zone of interests
protected or regulated by the statute. Second, he must show he has suffered an
adverse effect. Third, he must show the adverse effect was caused by a final
agency action.'0 '
In Clarke, a 1987 case arising under the APA, the Court broadened the
application of the zone of interests test to actions arising under the APA.' 2
After this, standing under the APA became easy to establish. 0 3 For a plaintiff
to have standing, his injury need only arguably fall within the zone of interests
protected by the particular provision of the statute which forms the basis for his
action.'04
The APA only provides for review of actions that are considered final
agency actions. "5 In defining what is considered final, the Court has stated that
the action must complete the decision making process.'0 6 This means that

98. See Linda B. Zeit, Standing in EnvironmentalLitigation Under the Administrative
ProcedureAct, 5 U. BAIT. J. ENVTtL. L. 112, 115 (1995). See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget,
400 U.S. 62 (1970); Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103
(1948).
99. See Edward B. Sears, Note, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation:Environmental
Plaintiffs are Tripped up on Standing, 24 CoNN. L. REv. 293, 308 (1991).
100. See Zeit, supra note 98, at 115; see, e.g., Association of Data Processing v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970). For a discussion of the standing requirements of Article III, see supra notes
38-56 and accompanying text.
101. See Sears, supra note 99, at 308. For a discussion of the development of the zone of
interests test, see supra notes 57-81 and accompanying text.
102. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399. The Court held that a right of review would be denied
only "if the plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes
implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the
suit. The test is not meant to be especially demanding ....
Id. See also Sheldon K. Rennie,
Bennett v. Plenert: Using the Zone-Of-Interests Test to Limit Standing Under the Endangered
Species Act, 7 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 375, 382-83 (1996).
103. See Rennie, supra note 102, at 382-83.
104. See National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 883.
105. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
106. See Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc., 333 U.S. at 112-13. Plaintiffs sought review
of an order by the Civil Aeronautics Board denying an application to provide overseas air
transportation. See id. at 104-05. The order required the approval of the President. See id. at
105-06. The Court held there was no final agency action until after the President's review. See
id. at 112.
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rights are granted or denied or obligations are incurred from which legal
consequences will flow.107
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In determining Petitioners had standing to sue under the ESA and APA,
the Court focused on four issues. It considered whether Petitioners fell within
the zone of interests protected by the ESA; 10 8 whether Petitioners met the
Article I standing requirements; 0 9 whether the ESA provided for review of
Petitioners' claims;'10 and whether the APA provided for review of Petitioners'
claims.'l

First, the Court determined that Congress expanded the zone of interests
test in the ESA's citizen suit provision." 2 It compared the expansive wording
of the ESA to other statutes 13 and looked at the subject matter and provisions
of the ESA. 4 The Court noted that the environment is a subject in which all
persons have an interest," 5 and it determined that the obvious purpose of the
statute is to encourage private enforcement." 6
The Court found no basis in the Ninth Circuit's ruling that this expanded
right applied only to those environmentalists bringing actions alleging underenforcement." 7 The Court analyzed the text of the statute and determined that
"any person" applies not only to actions against private parties for violations
107. See id. at 112-13. The Civil Aeronautics Board's order was unconditionally subject
to the President's review. See id. at 105-06. The Court held that "administrative orders are not
reviewable unless and until they impose an obligation, deny a right or fix some legal
relationship as a consummation of the administrative process." Id. at 112-13. See also Port of
Boston, 400 U.S. at 71 (holding "the relevant considerations in determining finality are whether
the process.., has reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process
of adjudication and whether rights or obligations have been determined or legal consequences
will flow from the agency action.").
108. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1160-63.
109. See id. at 1163-65.
110. See id. at 1165-67.
111. See id. at 1167-69.
112. See id. at 1162.
113. See id. The Court commented that the ESA's provision that "any person may
commence a civil suit" is an authorization of "remarkable breadth when compared with the
language Congress ordinarily uses." Id.
114. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162.
115. See id.
116. See id. The Court examined the textual construction of the statute and determined this
intent from the absence of diversity jurisdiction requirements; the provision for recovery of
costs of litigation, including expert witness fees; and the reservation to the government of both
a right of first refusal to pursue the action and a right to intervene. See id.
117. See id. at 1163. The Ninth Circuit's holding in effect required that a party must seek
to protect endangered species, thus alleging under-enforcement, in order to have standing under
the zone of interests test. See Bennett, 63 F.3d at 921.
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and the Secretary for under-enforcement, but also to actions against the
Secretary for over-enforcement."18 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals erred in holding plaintiffs must allege an interest in the preservation
of endangered species in order to have standing under the citizen suit provision
of the ESA." 9
Second, the Court examined Article Ill standing requirements which
require an injury in fact that is fairly traceable and redressable.120 Since general
factual allegations at the pleading stage are treated as though they include the
facts necessary to support the allegation, Petitioners' complaint alleged the
required injury in fact. 2 '
The government argued that any injury Petitioners might have suffered
was not fairly traceable to the Biological Opinion because the Biological
Opinion was advisory in nature, and the Bureau had the final responsibility for
determining what, if any, action would occur. 122 The Court stated that there
must be a causal connection between the injury in fact and the defendants'
actions which is not the result of the actions of an independent third party. 23
The Court noted, however, that this does not exclude injuries that result from
the determinative or coercive effect of a third party.' 24 While agencies like the
Bureau theoretically may choose not to follow recommendations in the FWS's
opinions, they rarely do so. 25 The Biological Opinion's Incidental Take
Statement 126 protects the agencies and their employees from civil and criminal
liabilities. 27 Therefore, the Court concluded the Biological Opinion
had a
28
coercive effect on the Bureau and the injury is thus fairly traceable.

118. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1163. "[T]he 'any person' formulation applies to all the
causes of action authorized by § 1540(g) .... " Id. This includes actions alleging overenforcement under § 1533. See id. "[T]here is no textual basis for saying that [Congress's]
expansion of standing requirements applies to environmentalists alone." Id.
119. See id.
120. See id. For a discussion of Article III requirements, see supra notes 38-56 and
accompanying text.
121. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1164 (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561).
122. See id. "Following the issuance of a biological opinion, the Federal agency shall
determine whether and in what manner to proceed with the action in light of its section 7
obligations and the Service's biological opinion." 50 C.F.R. § 402.15(a) (1995).
123. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1163 (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61).
124. See id. at 1164.
125. See Brief for the Respondents at 20-21, Bennett (No. 95-813).
126. The Incidental Take Statement essentially operates like a permit, allowing the "taking"
of endangered species as long as the agency respects the statement's terms and conditions. See
Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1165.
127. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1165. Civil penalties for violating the ESA are set forth in
16 U.S.C. § 1540(a) (1994). Criminal penalties are set forth in 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b) (1994).
128. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1164.
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The Court also concluded that the Bureau would be unlikely to impose the
minimum water level requirements if the Biological Opinion was set aside;
therefore, the injury would likely be redressed by a favorable decision. 2 9
Finding an injury in fact which was traceable and redressable, the Court held
Petitioners30 alleged sufficient facts to meet the Article III requirements for
standing. 1
Third, the Court examined two types ofjudicial review available under the
132
3
ESA's citizen suit provision. ' The first type, set forth in § 1540(g)(1)(C),
allows an action against the Secretary of Interior for failure to perform nondiscretionary duties required under § 1533.133 Section 1533(b)(2) 3 4 requires
the Secretary to consider economic impact in making determinations about
critical habitat.'35 Petitioners alleged the Biological Opinion determined critical
habitat without considering economic impact.'3 6 The Court concluded that
while the Secretary's ultimate determination would be reviewable only under
an abuse of discretion standard, that does not change the fact that the Secretary
is required to consider economic impact.137 Thus, Petitioners' allegation that
the Secretary did not consider the economic impact of its decision falls within
the ESA citizen suit provision and is a reviewable action under this
provision. 131
The second type of judicial review under the ESA, set forth in §
1540(g)(1)(A), provides an action to enjoin any person who violates any
provision of the Act. 39 The Court determined that this provides an action
against those who violate the statute, but it does not provide another means for
judicial review of the Secretary's administration of the statute.'40 The Court
129. See id. at 1165.
130. See id. at 1169.
131. See id. at 1165.
132. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(i)(C) (1994).
133. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (1994). "[A]ny person may commence a civil suit on his
own behalf... (C) against the Secretary [of the Interior] where there is alleged a failure of the
Secretary to perform any act or duty under section 1533 of this title which is not discretionary
with the Secretary." Id.
134. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994).
135. See id. For a discussion regarding the purpose and significance of establishing critical
-habitat, see supra note 20.
136. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1165.
137. See id. at 1166. The Court stated, "It is rudimentary administrative law that discretion
as to the substance of the ultimate decision does not confer discretion to ignore the required
procedures of decision making." Id.
138. See id.
139. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (1994). "[A]ny person may commence a civil suit on
his own behalf- (A) to enjoin any person... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision
of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof .. " 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)
(1994).
140. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1166.
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determined that to hold otherwise would conflict with the specific limitation in
§ 1540(g)(1)(C) to actions involving a failure to perform non-discretionary
duties required under § 1533.41
Finally, the Court determined the APA 142 allowed review of Petitioners'
§ 1536141 claims which alleged the Secretary did not use the best scientific data
and that its alternatives were not reasonable or prudent.1" In deciding this, the
protected
Court considered whether Petitioners fell within the zone of interests
1 45
and whether the Biological Opinion was a final agency action.
The Court concluded that for purposes of review under the APA, the zone
of interests was determined not by looking at the overall purpose of the ESA,
but by considering the specific provision on which the Petitioners relied.146
The Court stated the obvious intention of the requirement to use the best
scientific data was to insure that implementation of the ESA was not haphazard
and that unnecessary economic hardship was avoided. 47 Therefore, Petitioners
fell within the zone of interests protected by § 1536.141
Finally, the Court concluded the Biological Opinion was a final agency
action. The opinion met the two conditions generally required for an action
to be considered final. 50 First, the opinion was the completion of the agency's
decision making process. 5' Second, legal consequences, rights, and obligations resulted from the opinion because the Bureau was protected from
potential criminal52 and civil penalties only if it complied with the Incidental
Take Statement.
Thus, the Court determined that Petitioners had standing under Article III
and none of their claims were barred by the zone of interests test.5 3 The Court
§ 1533
held the ESA's citizen suit provision provided review for Petitioners'
15 4
claim, and the APA provided review for Petitioners' § 1536 claims.
141. See id.
142. For a discussion of the purpose of the APA, see supra note 23.
143. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1994).
144. See Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1167. For a discussion of Petitioners' allegations regarding
"best available scientific data," see supra note 2 1.
145. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1167-68.
146. See id. at 1167. "It is difficult to understand how the Ninth Circuit could have failed
to see this from our cases." Id.
147. See id. at 1168.
148. See id.at 1167.
149. See id.
at 1168. The APA provides for judicial review of "final agency actions." See
5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
150. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1168.
151. See id. This point was uncontested by the respondents. See id.
152. See id.For a discussion of the protection provided by the Incidental Take Statement,
see supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
153. See Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1169.
154. See id.
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V. SIGNIFICANCE

Bennett v. Spear'55 has been described as one of the most important
decisions issued by the Supreme Court in the last twenty-five years. 156 This
unanimous decision 57 was a rare loss in the realm of environmental regulation
for the government.'58 Environmentalists expect to benefit from the ruling,'59
but it has been heralded as a victory for business.1"
Before Bennett, plaintiffs with an economic interest had difficulty
obtaining judicial review of actions governed by the ESA. 16 ' Now, the door
has been opened to literally "any person" who can meet the minimal requirements of Article II. Thus, "any person" includes not only private attorneysgeneral wishing to enforce the provisions of the Act, but also those who assert
over enforcement or mal-enforcement and can show the existence of an Article
I controversy. 162
Through its decision in Bennett v. Spear,'63 the Supreme Court also has
further defined and refined the application of the zone of interests test. The
Court has given clearer guidance in how to determine whether one falls within
the zone of interests protected by any given statute. 164 Because the Court has
opened its doors to plaintiffs under the citizen suit provision of the ESA, the

155. 117S.Ct.1154(1997).
156. See Perkins, supra note 19, at B7.
157. See W. Henson Moore, EndangeredSpecies Act Must Be Enforcedfor the Benefit of
All, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 19, Apr. 21, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 2800629. "It is most
instructive that the court's ruling was unanimous. When justices as philosophically and
politically diverse as those sitting on the Supreme Court reach the same conclusion, it is not
simply a decision - it's a mandate." Id.
158. See Joan Biskupic & Joby Warrick, Court Rules Landowners Can Use Endangered
Species Act to FightProtections,THE WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1997, at A 11, available in 1997
WL 10008317.
159. See Marianne Lavelle, Businesses Gain Ground on Standing - EndangeredSpecies
Act Ruling Will Affect Many Suits, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 7, 1997, at BI. "[T]he green groups
decided not to fight the ranchers on standing, because they, too, want a broad interpretation of
standing ..... Id.
160. See Edward Felsenthal, Legal Beat, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1997, at B 12, availablein
1997 WL-WSJ 2413737.
161. See Becker, supra note 1, at 1071.
162. See Lavelle, supranote 159, at BI. "It has always been clear.., that citizens can sue
the government for failure to protect threatened flora or fauna. But... [Bennett] clarifies that
citizens also can sue if they feel the government has gone too far." Lavelle, supra note 159, at
B I. "[T]he Supreme Court has done no more than give landowners the same standing in the
court as short-nosed suckers, snail darters and gnatcatchers." Perkins, supra note 19, at B7.
"Humans, not just suckers, will have their day in court." EndangeredHumans, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 1997, at A20, availablein 1997 WL 3666884.
163. 117S. Ct. 1154(1997).
164. See id. at 1160-63.
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APA, and possibly other statutes as well, 65 some scholars have suggested that
this ruling will lead to a surge in litigation.' 66
Standing is a threshold issue that every plaintiff must face.167 Therefore,
the Court's detailed analysis of the proper application of the doctrine of
standing and the tests to be applied to measure standing, is significant to every
potential plaintiff in the federal court system. The Court's decision, broadening the tests used to determine standing, has made it easier for persons to have
68
their day in court.
R. MargaretDobson

165. See Lavelle, supra note 159, at B 1. "The broad interpretation of the right to sue also
likely will have an impact on actions under other federal regulatory laws - virtually all of
which have explicit or implicit citizen suit provisions .... The Bennett decision could also
affect a case with no environmental issues." Lavelle, supra note 159, at BI.
166. See Felsenthal, supra note 160, at B 12. "'There's going to be a surge of litigation
under the Endangered Species Act as a result of this,' predicted Patrick Parenteau, director of
the Environmental Law Center at Vermont Law School." Id.
167. See GREGORY, supra note 33, at 11, 30 n.2.
168. See Perkins, supra note 19, at B7.

